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Abstract  
Studies of electoral integrity typically focus on electoral evaluators (expert 
surveys), electoral consumers (electors) and occasionally, electoral producers 
(electoral administrators). Using a unique new dataset collected at the British 
general elections of 2010, 2015 and 2017, this article examines evaluations of 
electoral integrity amongst a previously unresearched group of electoral users – 
the election agents of candidates standing for election. Using measures of both 
negative and positive electoral integrity, the article models explanations of users’ 
evaluations, focussing on agent characteristics, geography and the electoral 
status of the district or constituency. It shows that evaluations of electoral integrity 
vary significantly and highlights both that questions of electoral integrity are more 
localized than widespread, and that despite the significant impact of winner/loser 
effects, issues of electoral integrity are strongly related to the urban characteristics 
of an electoral district. In so doing, it makes a significant contribution to the 




A significant international literature has developed on electoral integrity, illustrating importantly 
that concerns are not confined only to developing democracies, but to mature ones as well 
(Alvarez, Hall & Hyde, 2008; Birch, 2008, 2011; Bowler & Donovan, 2013; Karp et al, 2018; 
Lehoucq, 2003; Norris, 2014, 2015). Indeed, comparative rankings of electoral integrity reveal 
not only fairly significant variation between established democracies, but also less established 
regimes scoring more highly than more mature ones. The USA ranks below Argentina and 
Chile in the Americas, while the UK is ranked below Portugal and Spain. Indeed, while the UK 
is categorised as having high levels of electoral integrity, only Malta is ranked below it in North-
West Europe (Norris, Wynter & Cameron: 2018:7). Electoral integrity is clearly a concern. But 
are concerns merited across the whole of a country at the macro level, or are issues of 
electoral integrity localized at the micro level? This article uses a unique new dataset which 
captures evaluations of electoral integrity at district or constituency level to analyse this 
question in the British case. 
 
The rankings described above are based on expert surveys of evaluations of electoral integrity 
– a group that might be classified as electoral evaluators. Other studies (either comparative 
                                                          
1  This research was funded by the Economic & Social Research Council (RES-000-22-2762; ES/M007251/1; 
ES/R005052/1) and the Electoral Commission. 
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or at a national level) typically focus on electoral consumers (electors) (Beaulieu, 2014; Birch, 
2008; Karp, Mai & Norris, 2017) or on occasions, electoral producers (election administrators) 
(Clark, 2017). There is, however, another group that merits attention – electoral users. This 
group are closer to the production of electoral services than electoral consumers and are likely 
to have a better understanding of the complexity of electoral service provision – this user group 
is electoral agents.  
 
All candidates in UK elections must, by law, have an electoral agent. The electoral agent is 
legally responsible for the conduct and finances of their candidate’s campaign. Given the work 
that occurs on a day-to-day basis over the course of a campaign, an agent will almost certainly 
have a particularly well-informed view of the quality of electoral administration in the 
constituency as well as in respect of any suggestions of electoral fraud. This article draws on 
studies of these agents, and in addition to generating data from a key user group, also provides 
the opportunity for comparison with electoral consumers. We will be able to assess the degree 
to which the views of electoral consumers and users towards electoral integrity align. Such 
findings have the potential to have a significant impact on policy. 
 
The focus on election users also further illuminates the study of electoral integrity more 
broadly. Electoral evaluators offer opinions on a national basis (at the macro level). Equally, 
electoral consumers will deliver evaluations that range from the national to the local. Electoral 
users, however – like electoral producers – are focussed at the local or district/constituency 
level (the micro level), since their experience and expertise lies there, though unlike electoral 
producers, electoral users’ perceptions are not based in part on evaluations of their own 
productive efficiency. This district or constituency level focus is highly significant, because in 
the UK case, at least, problems with electoral fraud and electoral integrity may be localised 
rather than being a national problem (Electoral Commission, 2014: 3; Clark & James, 2015; 
Stewart, 2006)2. Equally, as James (2017: 133) shows, the US experience is such that 
variations in the quality of electoral administration and failings in electoral integrity are 
frequently attributed to the decentralised management of elections. A similar system operates 
in the United Kingdom, where despite central guidance being distributed by the Electoral 
Commission, the administration of elections is managed by local authorities. As Clark (2017: 
474) observes, localized standards of electoral administration can vary considerably, with the 
effect on evaluations being at best variable, but at worst, potentially undermining perceptions 
of the entire electoral process. Thus, an examination at district or constituency level reveals 
                                                          
2  That said, while Stewart (2006) focusses his attention on the case of electoral fraud in Birmingham related to the 
2004 local elections, he does warn that such cases could lead to contagion in respect of fraudulent behaviour. 
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not only aggregated evaluations of electoral integrity at the macro level, but also variation that 
lies beneath the national level (at the micro level). This unique dataset allows us to analyse 
such variation in evaluations across districts/constituencies and therefore gain an 
understanding of why those evaluations vary. 
 
Coupled with this, electoral users - agents - possess an important quality in respect of 
evaluations of electoral integrity that electoral consumers – electors - frequently lack: 
expertise. As Norris et al (2017: 5) note, ordinary citizens will often lack the capacity to 
evaluate elections with any precision because they lack knowledge or correct information, 
largely because their understanding will be limited to their own interaction at the ballot box. 
This can lead to more sceptical evaluations of electoral integrity, not least because more 
accurate evaluations of electoral integrity are influenced by higher levels of education and 
knowledge, and greater interest in politics (Beaulieu, 2014; Norris et al, 2017: 22). Certainly, 
the UK Electoral Commission (2014: 14) found that voters rarely have a good understanding 
of  fraud and that their views ‘…are rarely influenced by first-hand experience of electoral fraud 
and are more likely to be based on cases reported by the media and people’s own set of 
assumptions, some of them unfounded.’  Electoral agents, on the other hand may be better 
placed to provide more accurate evaluations, since like electoral administrators (Clark, 
2017:480) they have much better understanding of how the electoral process works. 
Therefore, we may expect to see differences between the evaluations of electoral consumers 
and users. Such a comparison is important, because if there is a suspicion that consumers’ 
concerns about electoral integrity are inflated, then the analysis of a group that significantly is 
more knowledgeable about electoral processes (users) provides the opportunity to evaluate 
the extent to which consumers’ concerns may be exaggerated. 
 
Electoral Integrity 
The growth of electoral integrity as a field of study has largely mirrored the increase in the 
number of elections worldwide as more countries have adopted liberal democratic norms, 
together with a growing recognition in mature democracies – particularly the United States -   
that there are significant issues associated with electoral maladministration (Norris, 2018). 
Electoral integrity matters across all democracies, not only emerging ones. It can be 
conceptualised in a variety of ways. Norris (2018) for example, identifies traditional 
conceptions: negative (characterised by fraud and malpractice) and positive (characterised by 
credibility and competitiveness), as well as a more fulsome conceptualisation, inspired by 
human rights and which seeks to capture (in a positive sense) a wide range of electoral 
practices. What is very apparent is that any analysis of electoral integrity should not only 
examine instances and perceptions of malpractice and fraud – negative electoral integrity, but 
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also instances and perceptions of good practice – positive electoral integrity. Election 
processes will neither be all good or all bad – what is required is an analysis of both. In this 
article, therefore we examine both levels of satisfaction with electoral administration (positive), 
as well as perceptions of electoral fraud (negative). Although the variables are not direct 
opposites of each other (such that an increase in one would automatically lead to a decrease 
in the other), our general expectation is that by using these indicators, we would observe that 
more positive evaluations of electoral integrity would involve higher levels of satisfaction with 
electoral administration and lower levels of perception of electoral fraud. Equally, those with 
more negative evaluations of electoral integrity would be expected to have lower levels of 
satisfaction with electoral administration and higher levels of perception of electoral fraud. 
 
In respect of fraud, there is, however, a need for some definition. Birch (2011: 11-13) identifies 
four approaches to what she describes as malpractice: legal, perceptual, ‘best practice’ and 
normative. Legal is a violation of electoral law; perceptual is by definition subjective, and 
therefore has no agreed boundary in respect of malpractice; ‘best practice’ represents 
differentiation from international norms; while normative assesses practice against norms in 
democratic theory. Instances of malpractice can manifest themselves in manipulation of the 
law (such as gerrymandering and manipulation of voter eligibility), the voter (such as violation 
and campaign finance laws and inducements to vote in a particular way or not vote at all) and 
the vote itself (such as manipulation of the voting process and the count) (Birch, 2011: 28-39; 
Hill et al, 2017: 775; Lehoucq, 2003). In surveys of electoral consumers and users (electors 
and electoral agents) we are considering perceptual fraud, which by definition may not reflect 
actual violations of electoral law. However, we may expect to see variation between 
consumers and users, as users will have a better understanding of electoral processes, and 
thus, we may expect their perceptions to have a stronger relationship to legal definitions of 
fraud and malpractice. 
 
The article therefore seeks to uses measures of both positive and negative electoral integrity 
to assess variation in evaluations, both over time and between electoral users. There are two 
research questions: 
 
1. Have evaluations of electoral integrity as measured by satisfaction levels with election 
administration and perceptions of fraud changed over time? 
2. What factors help predict evaluations of electoral integrity, as measured by levels of 
satisfaction with electoral administration and perceptions of electoral fraud? 
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Predictors of Evaluations – Theory 
The temporal aspect to satisfaction with electoral administration and perceptions of electoral 
fraud is a function of two things. First, we might expect that as electoral administration occurs 
more often, then implementation would be improved, thereby improving levels of satisfaction. 
In other words, as procedures and practice become more entrenched, there may be fewer 
problems. This may produce mixed results in the British case. In the first instance, electoral 
administration has always taken place at the level of the local authority. So – even over a 
period of three elections, we might not expect to see much change, since most procedures 
are fully entrenched. On the other hand, the national-level Electoral Commission has only 
existed since 2001. Although the Commission has no formal control over local authorities 
(James, 2017), it does have reporting oversight and is active in providing guidance to local 
authorities, candidates and electoral agents. Thus, we may expect to observe some 
improvement in evaluations over time as the Commission’s guidance is adopted more widely. 
 
Second, and more significantly, we may expect to see variation in evaluations of electoral 
integrity in respect of the available time for the administration of the election. Clark (2017: 475-
6, 486) shows that the quality of electoral administration suffers where there are concurrent 
elections, through the additional pressure placed on electoral administrators. Thus, if pressure 
through additional workload were to be an issue, we would expect the see evaluations of the 
2017 election to be lower than those in 2010 and 2015. The reasoning behind this is that while 
the elections of 2010 and 2015 took place after full five-year parliamentary terms (thus allowing 
electoral administrators time to prepare for an election), in 2017, the election was a ‘snap’ one: 
unexpectedly called just two years after the previous election and leaving administrators 
considerably less time in which to put arrangements in place. That said, there may be reason 
to suspect that evaluations in 2017 could be higher overall than either 2010 or 2015 since 
unlike those two years, when concurrent local elections took place across large parts of 
England, there were no concurrent elections in 2017. The general election was held in the 
June of that year, whereas local authority elections took place a month earlier. Thus, our first 
hypothesis is: 
 
H1. Evaluations of electoral integrity will be negatively affected by the sudden calling of 
the general election in 2017 
 
Explaining satisfaction with electoral administration and perceptions of fraud is by necessity, 
a multivariate exercise. As Alvarez and Boehmke (2008: 104) note, the correlates may include 
socio-demographic, partisanship and electoral competition. Moreover, in keeping with Clark 
(2017:472), analysis on a district or constituency basis (as is the case in this article) suggests 
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considerable variation, which may be explained by a variety of electoral, geographical and 
socio-demographic factors. Broadly speaking, therefore, there are three clusters of variables, 
which may affect users’ evaluations: the characteristics of the agent (experience and 
partisanship), the geographic and socio-demographic structure of the constituency, and the 
nature of electoral competition in the seat. 
 
The importance of partisan cues is well established in the literature (Beaulieu, 2014; Norris et 
al: 2017: 8-9), with studies in the US showing the importance of whether a citizen identifies 
with the Republicans or the Democrats on  whether they perceive electoral fraud – especially 
where partisanship is stronger. In the context of this study, we would also expect to find 
variation in evaluations and perceptions depending upon the agent’s party, especially as the 
level of partisanship of agents will be stronger than the vast majority of voters.  Agents make 
themselves legally responsible for a candidate’s campaign, and apart from being a party 
member, also display a high level of activity typically associated with stronger partisans. There 
is no theoretical reason why the partisan cues of some parties should matter more than others 
or that those cues should be in any particular direction. Our only expectation is that we should 
expect to variation by party. That said, it should be noted that in addition to the overall impact 
of partisan cues, studies of voters’ perceptions suggest that voters for right wing parties may 
be more concerned with electoral fraud than voters for left wing parties (Birch, 2008: 313; Karp 
et al: 2018: 15-16; Norris et al, 2017: 9).  
 
Agent experience may also help explain levels of satisfaction and perceptions of fraud. Karp 
et al (2018) find that greater knowledge of electoral procedures impacts favourably on attitudes 
towards electoral integrity, and may be a function of longer experience of elections, which 
generates better understanding and more accurate judgments (Norris et al, 2017: 18). Equally, 
Beaulieu (2014) shows lower levels of education are associated with higher perceptions of 
fraud. In the context of this article, this will apply to whether agents have previously run an 
election campaign. Thus, following the logic of studies of electoral consumers, those agents 
with more experience should be more likely to be satisfied with electoral administration and 
less likely to perceive electoral fraud. Taken together, our second set of hypotheses are:  
 
H2. Evaluations of electoral integrity will be a function of agents’ party affiliation 
H3. Evaluations of electoral integrity will be negatively affected by agent inexperience 
 
Geographic factors are a function both of formal structure and more conventional geographic 
variation, and may be good predictors both of satisfaction with electoral administration and 
perceptions of fraud. Analyses in the USA and UK reveal, for example, that there can be state 
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or country effects in terms of electoral integrity. Thus, Norris et al (2017: 17) find significant 
variation between public and expert evaluations of integrity in different American states, while 
Clark shows that in the United Kingdom, electoral management is best delivered in Scotland, 
compared with England and Wales (Clark, 2015: 97-8; Clark,  2017: 486-7). We may, 
therefore, expect to see similar variation in these analyses – both because election 
administration is conducted at local authority level rather than at national level, and because, 
while the Electoral Commission, which oversees electoral management, is a UK-wide body, it 
is organised on a semi-federal basis with key offices in each of the countries within the UK. 
Overall therefore, we expect only to observe variation by country, but have no expectation in 
respect of which countries will display more positive evaluations of electoral integrity, bar the 
findings of Clark (2015, 2017). 
A second key geographic variation concerns the urban-rural divide. At a formal level, this is 
explicitly recognized in British law through the designation of county (rural) and borough 
(urban) seats, whereby candidates in county seats have higher baseline spending limits than 
those in borough seats, reflecting the greater expense required to reach a more dispersed 
electorate. This designation is, however, a little crude for our purposes – what is more 
significant is the degree of urban characteristics in a district or constituency. Comparative 
research in the USA and Mexico, for example shows that instances of electoral fraud and 
population density are closely correlated (Alvarez and Boehmke, 2008: 106-7; Lehoucq, 
2003:250-1)  - though Lehoucq (2003: 250-1) also shows that in Costa Rica, fraud is more 
likely to be observed in the least populated provinces. Similarly, Clark (2015:90) highlights that 
many of the investigations into potential electoral mismanagement at the 2010 general election 
were in large, densely populated cities. Coupled with this, more densely populated areas 
present greater challenges for electoral administrators, and it impacts negatively on the 
completeness and health of the electoral register. (Clark, 2017: 475; James and Jervier, 
2017:466) 
Population density is, however, only one aspect of the potential geographic variations between 
constituencies. Two further factors are the levels of ethnic diversity and residential mobility, 
both of which are associated with more urban environments and issues of electoral integrity. 
Alvarez and Boehmke (2008: 106-7) show, for example,  that electoral fraud is higher in more 
ethnically diverse parts on California, while the quality of election management in the UK is 
challenged in areas of higher ethnic diversity – particularly where groups are hard to reach 
(James & Jervier, 2017:466; Clark, 2017:477). Similarly,  Hill et al (2017: 774) note that of the 
18 local authorities areas deemed to be at risk of electoral fraud by the Electoral Commission, 
all but one were in areas with high ethnic minority populations. Residential mobility may also 
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impact upon electoral integrity. James and Jervier (2017: 465-6) for example, show that the 
completeness of the electoral register tends to be lower in areas where there is a larger private 
rental sector, reflecting the lower levels of residential mobility amongst residents who own their 
own homes, while the Electoral Commission (2014: 16) note that areas vulnerable to electoral 
fraud are often characterised by a transient population and a high number of multiple 
occupancy houses. Certainly, all three urban characteristics (population density, level of ethnic 
diversity and size of the rented housing sector) are regularly associated with lower levels of 
electoral turnout (Denver, 2010, 2015, 2018). Given population density, levels of ethnic 
diversity and residential mobility are associated more with urban areas, our third set of 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H4. Evaluations of electoral integrity will be a function of the country in which the election 
takes place. 
H5. Evaluations of electoral integrity will be more negative in more urban areas. 
 
The final cluster of key factors influencing satisfaction with electoral administration and 
perceptions of electoral fraud relates to electoral competition and outcomes. A well-
established theme in the literature is the impact of winning and losing on perceptions of 
electoral fraud. Judgements tend to be a function of the so-called ‘winner-loser’ effect, such 
that supporters of the winning side tend to be more satisfied with the conduct of the election 
and more confident in the integrity of the process. At a more abstract level, there is ample 
comparative evidence that winners or supporters of incumbents tend to display higher levels 
of trust in government or parties (see Fisher et al, 2010: 179; Pattie & Johnston, 2001:204-9) 
or in terms of satisfaction with democracy (Anderson & Guillory, 1997).  As it relates to 
electoral fraud, there are similar patterns. In a twenty-eight country cross-national analysis, for 
example, Birch (2008) finds that citizens who identify with electoral losers have consistently 
lower perceptions of electoral fairness, a finding mirrored by Karp et al (2018) in Australia and 
Norris et al in the USA (2017). Blais et al (2017) make similar findings, though also showing 
that individuals who are more committed to parties, are more likely to perceive electoral 
unfairness if they lose.  Given that electoral agents are, by definition, more committed - at least 
to the candidate if not the party - than voters, we would expect to see the common pattern of 
the effect of winning or losing being reflected in both perceptions of fraud, and in satisfaction 
with electoral administration. Indeed, given the insight from Blais et al (2017) which highlights 
the importance of commitment to post-election satisfaction, we would expect such effects to 
be amplified with electoral agents. 
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The second electoral factor is the degree of electoral competitiveness. The chances of 
dissatisfaction in more competitive seats is likely to be higher, both because the contest is 
likely to be harder fought and because the outcome is uncertain. Certainly, there is clear 
evidence that the marginality or closeness of an electoral seat increases campaign activity 
(Fisher et al, 2019) and the amounts spent by candidates (Johnston & Pattie, 2014). And, as  
Howell and Justwan (2013: 337) suggest, elections that are non-competitive (that is, they are 
not marginal and the outcome is clear in advance) are likely to disconnect winners and losers 
from results, whereas the anxiety produced in a close contest will be more likely to impact 
upon levels of satisfaction.  Howell and Justwan (2013) show that support of a winning party 
in a close electoral contest has a positive impact on satisfaction with democracy (though not 
the reverse), and there is some comparative evidence that close electoral races tend be 
associated with higher levels of fraud (Alvarez and Boehmke, 2008: 109; Eisenstadt, 1999 – 
cited in Lehoucq, 2003: 250).  Overall, therefore there is good reason to think that evaluations 
in relation to electoral administration and electoral fraud will be related to the outcome and 
competitiveness of an electoral contest. Thus: 
 
H6. Evaluations of electoral integrity will be more negative amongst electoral losers. 
H7. Evaluations of electoral integrity will be more negative in more competitive electoral 
contests. 
 
Data and Method 
The data are drawn from unique surveys of electoral agents carried out immediately after the 
British general elections of 2010, 2015 and 2017. The focus of the article is responses to two 
questions capturing overall levels of satisfaction with electoral administration and perceptions 
of electoral fraud. As Birch (2008: 310) notes, reliance on a single survey item is not ideal, so 
in this study, we use both positive and negative evaluations of electoral integrity. If the findings 
are robust, we should observe similar patterns across both, with groups that are positive in 
their assessments of electoral administration being less likely to perceive electoral fraud and 
vice versa. Furthermore, the robustness of the findings will be enhanced by the fact that there 
are three separate repeat surveys.  Questions relating to electoral administration and 
perceptions of electoral fraud were co-designed with the UK Electoral Commission and 
responses used to inform the Commission’s reporting on the conduct of the election (Fisher 
et al, 2010, 2015, 2017). Agents from the principal parties in Great Britain were surveyed 
(Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party & Plaid Cymru) in all three 
elections. This article focuses on responses from the three parties fielding candidates across 
Great Britain in all three elections (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats) in order to 
be able make country comparisons, given the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru only 
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field candidates in their respective countries (Scotland and Wales). Surveys were sent to all 
agents of candidates from these parties immediately after the elections, and responses were 
representative of the population based on analyses of the electoral status of the seats from 
which agents responded. Details of responses are provided in the appendix. Additional data 
on agent characteristics were drawn from the wider survey of agents (of which the questions 
on electoral administration and perceptions of fraud formed a part). Data on constituency 
demographics were drawn from the census.  
 
Results 
Table 1 illustrates the overall levels of satisfaction with electoral administration at the 2010, 
2015 and 2017 elections, together with the net scores (satisfied minus dissatisfied). As a 
robustness check to establish any impact of concurrent elections, we also show results from 
England only (as there were no regular local authority elections in Scotland and Wales in 2010 
and 2015). What is apparent first is that levels of satisfaction are high – around 80% in both 
2010 and 2017, despite the fact that non-proportional electoral systems (such as the single 
member plurality system used in UK general elections) tend to be associated with poorer 
perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2008: 308). Such evaluations are generally 
comparable with perceptions of electoral evaluators, which are relevant to and comparable 
with those made by electoral users. Thus, evaluations of Procedures, Vote Count and 
Electoral Authorities in the United Kingdom are ranked amongst the best performing countries.  
That said, electoral evaluators’ perceptions of Voter Registration in the United Kingdom are 
notably poor and indeed, declined between 2015 and 2017 – though this decline was ascribed 
by Norris et al to national level legislation rather than poor electoral administration per se 
(Norris, Wynter & Cameron, 2018: 12, 27-8).  
 
For electoral users, there is, however, a dip in 2015, with satisfaction levels and the net score 
falling by over ten percentage points. This still represents a satisfaction level of 72%, but is 
notably lower than both 2010 and 2017, the differences between 2015 and both 2010 and 
2017 being statistically significant. The England only results show similar patterns, albeit with 
a slightly more modest dip in overall satisfaction in 2015 (though again, the differences 
between 2015 and both 2010 and 2017 are statistically significant). This means that in respect 
of satisfaction with electoral administration, H1 is rejected. Levels of satisfaction in 2017 were 
more comparable with 2010 than 2015 (though the difference between 2010 and 2017 is itself 
statistically significant), suggesting that the short period in which the 2017 election was 
organised administratively, had limited (if any) impact on levels of satisfaction. Rather, the 
lowest levels of satisfaction were in 2015 after a full five year term. The ability of electoral 
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administrators to plan ahead, enabled by full parliamentary terms would appear, therefore, to 
have no impact on the experience of this user group. 
 
Table 2 examines overall perceptions of electoral fraud. As with studies of electoral producers 
(Clark & James, 2015: 4) the proportions suspecting significant levels of fraud are small. For 
example, the proportion suggesting that there was A Lot or A Little fraud was 6% in 2015 and 
7% in 2017, while the proportions for England only are slightly higher - 11% and 10% 
respectively.  These levels are much smaller than the proportions amongst electoral 
consumers (electors), where the comparable percentages perceiving A Lot or A Little fraud in 
2015 and 2017 were 35% and 38% respectively (Ipsos-MORI, 2015; Electoral Commission, 
2017). This reflects the argument that citizen evaluations of election quality are likely to be 
inaccurate, as compared with electoral producers (electoral administrators) or more informed 
electoral users (electoral agents), citizens are less likely to be able to correctly assess the 
severity of an issue beyond their own personal experience (Electoral Commission, 2014: 14; 
Norris et al, 2017: 5).   
 
The question wording in respect of perceptions of fraud in 2010 differs from that in 2015 and 
20173, and whilst there are the same number of response categories, the significant change 
in the proportion of respondents answering Don’t Know means that comparisons between 
2015/2017 and 2010 should be made with significant caution. In addition to the frequencies, 
we add a net score, which excludes Don’t Know responses on the grounds that the reasoning 
behind the response was unknown.  To ensure that this did not produce any bias, the Don’t 
Know responses were analysed by agent experience, agent party, country, and seat winner. 
There were no patterns in respect of which agents were most likely to respond Don’t Know, 
indicating that their exclusion - while regrettable in terms of the impact on sample size - does 
not bias the results. The net score is calculated by subtracting any perception of fraud (A Lot/A 
Little/Hardly Any) from None At All.  Thus, a positive score indicates a greater perception of 
probity, while a negative score indicates greater perception of fraud.  
 
At first sight, there would appear to be some support for H1 in respect of perceptions of fraud, 
when comparing responses to the ‘full-term’ 2015 election with the ‘snap’ 2017 election. The 
proportion saying there was no fraud declined from 50% in 2015 to 44% in 2017, and the net 
score also suggests a modest decline (four points). In England, the decline was slight greater, 
                                                          
3  The 2010 question wording is: How concerned, if at all, were you about electoral fraud or abuse in your constituency 
at the general election? Very Concerned/Fairly Concerned/ Not Very Concerned/ Not At All Concerned/Don’t Know. 
The 2015 and 2017 wording is:  How much, if at all, do you think that electoral fraud took place at elections in your 
area? A lot/A little/Hardly at all/None at all/Don’t Know 
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with a seven point fall in the net score between 2015 and 2017.  However, in neither case is 
the difference statistically significant. Overall then, while we observe some temporal effects in 
levels of satisfaction with electoral administration and perceptions of electoral fraud, there is 
no support for H1 – the snap election in 2017 did not result in a tangible decline in evaluations 
of electoral integrity amongst electoral users. Nor indeed, was there any clear impact of the 
absence of concurrent elections in England in 2017. 
 
Table 1. Overall satisfaction with the administration of the General Election in your constituency 
 









Satisfied 83 (80) 72 (71) 78 (79) -5 (-1) 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 8 (9) 16 (16) 15 (15) +7 (+6) 
Dissatisfied 10 (12) 12 (13) 7 (7) -3 (-5) 
Net Satisfaction +73 (+68) +60 (+58) +71 (+72) -2 (+4) 
 
2010 n: Conservative = 273; Labour = 379; Liberal Democrat = 352 
2015 n: Conservative = 242; Labour = 333; Liberal Democrat = 325 
2017 n: Conservative = 175; Labour = 328; Liberal Democrat = 310 
 
 
Table 2. Perceptions of Electoral Fraud in your constituency 
 
 % (England Only in Parenthesis) 2010 2015 2017 
 (n=999) (n=888) (n=814) 
A lot (Very Concerned) 3 (4) 2 (3) 2 (4) 
A Little (Fairly Concerned) 10 (11) 4 (8) 5 (6) 
Hardly at All (Not Very Concerned) 33 (34) 19 (19) 16 (17)  
None at All (Not at All Concerned) 52 (51) 50 (43) 44 (39) 
Don’t Know 1 (1) 26 (27) 32 (35) 
Net perceptions excluding Don’t Know +5 (+3) +34 (+33) +30 (+26) 
 
Note: 2010 response categories in parenthesis 
2010 n: Conservative = 273; Labour = 377; Liberal Democrat = 349 
2015 n: Conservative = 239; Labour = 328; Liberal Democrat = 321 
2017 n: Conservative = 175; Labour = 327; Liberal Democrat = 312 
 
 
At an aggregated national level, therefore, we observe that overall satisfaction are relatively 
high and perceptions of fraud relatively low. But an aggregated national analysis only tells us 
so much. What we do now, therefore, is move from the macro level and apply multivariate 
analyses to explain variation in evaluations at the district or constituency (micro) level. As we 
have seen, there are broadly three types of explanatory variable to explore: the characteristics 
of the agent; the geography of the seat, and the electoral status of the seat. Agent 
characteristics are captured by two variables: party and experience. To operationalise party 
effects, we use dummy variables to denote a Conservative or Labour agent and use Liberal 
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Democrat agents as the reference category. Agent experience is captured by whether the 
agent had previous organised an election campaign (Yes=1, No=0). 
 
The geography of the seat is captured by two measures: the country within Great Britain in 
which the seat is located and a measure of how urban are the seat’s characteristics. The 
country variable is operationalised by dummy variables to denote whether the seats sits in 
Scotland or Wales, with England as the reference category.  The urban characteristics are a 
function of three variables: population density, proportion of non-white residents and 
proportion in rented accommodation (either public/private or third sector). Given the expected 
close relationship between these variables, all three were entered into a principal components 
analysis (PCA) and all loaded on one component (for solutions see appendix). Factor scores 
were produced from the PCA and used in the modelling, with the variable described as 
‘urbanness’.  
 
The electoral status of the seat is captured by two variables: the marginality of the seat and 
the winner of the seat. Marginality is a function of the result in the seat at the previous election 
and captures the closeness of the contest, which informs both the level of resource devoted 
by parties and candidates to the contest and prior perceptions in respect of the outcome4. The 
winner of the seat is a dummy variable, whereby winners of the seat at the election under 
investigation are coded as 1 and losers as 0. 
 
The dependent variables are calculated as follows. In the analyses of satisfaction with 
electoral administration, the full five point scale of the variable is used, running from Very 
Dissatisfied (low) thru Very Satisfied (high). In respect of perceptions of fraud, there are two 
analyses. The first analysis uses a four point scale running from None at All (low) thru A Lot 
(high) for 2015 and 2017. In 2010, the four point scale runs from Not at All Concerned (low) 
thru Very Concerned (high). In all cases, Don’t Know responses were eliminated from the 
multivariate analysis again because the reasoning behind the response was unknown and 
because, as per the analysis in Table 2, there were no patterns in respect of which agents 
were most likely to respond Don’t Know. The models were estimated using ordinal regression 
as the appropriate method, due to the characteristics and distribution of the dependent 
variables. A second analysis was undertaken on perceptions of fraud using a binary response 
as the dependent variable. Those expressing any concern about fraud were coded as 1 and 
those with no concern coded as 0. As with the other analysis of electoral fraud, Don’t Know 
                                                          
4  The was a boundary review between the 2005 and 2010 elections, so marginality for all affected seats at the 2010 
election is estimated – See Rallings & Thrasher, 2007.  
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responses were excluded. Reflecting the fact that in these analyses the dependent variable 
was binary, logistic regression was used. 
 
The analyses in Tables 3 and 4 use pooled data with fixed effects for the election year. The 
analysis of satisfaction with electoral administration uses pooled data across all three elections 
(2010, 2015 and 2017). For the analysis of perceptions of electoral fraud, only data from 2015 
and 2017 are analysed together due to the question wording difference in 2010. The analyses 
of perceptions of electoral fraud in 2010 are modelled separately, and are shown alongside 
the pooled analyses in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
There is support (albeit widely varying) for all six hypotheses (H2, H3, H4. H5, H6 H7). Agent 
experience (H3) registers a statistically significant effect on perceptions of fraud in the 2010 
logistic regression (Table 4). As predicted, less experienced agents were more likely to 
perceive fraud in that election. In all other models, however, agent experience has no 
statistically significant effect. The other key agent characteristic (party) makes a more 
significant difference, however (H2). Conservative and Labour agents are more likely to be 
satisfied with electoral administration than their Liberal Democrat counterparts. However, in 
respect of perceptions of fraud, in both the ordinal and logistic regressions models, 
Conservatives are also most likely to perceive fraud, reflecting comparative research, which 
suggests that perceptions of fraud tend to be greatest amongst parties on the right (Birch, 
2008; Karp et al, 2018, Norris et al, 2017). At first sight, this might be a curious finding, given 
that like Labour agents, Conservative ones were also positively disposed towards electoral 
administration. Our expectation is that if a group is positive about electoral integrity, we would 
expect them to be less likely to perceive fraud. However, it may not necessarily be an odd 
discovery. While satisfaction with electoral administration captures positive electoral integrity 
and perceptions of fraud negative electoral integrity, the measures used are not direct 
opposites of each other. It would be theoretically possible to perceive fraud as being engaged 
in by competitor parties, while being satisfied by the way in which elections are administered 
– especially if the administration prevents any fraud benefiting competitors. Nonetheless, as 
we shall see, for other explanations of variation in electoral integrity, the patterns are more as 
expected. For Labour, agents were significantly less likely to perceive fraud in 2010, but there 
was no statistically significant effect of Labour partisanship in the other two elections. Overall, 
H2 is confirmed in respect of the agent’s party delivering partisan though the direction of the 
impact varies depending upon whether positive or negative electoral integrity is being 
evaluated. The impact of agent experience, however is only confirmed to a very limited degree 
(H3). 
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With respect to geography, we find support for H4 and H5 in all models. Agents in Wales and 
Scotland are more likely to be satisfied with electoral administration than agents in England. 
In respect of perceptions of fraud, however we see that while agents in Scotland are less likely 
to perceive fraud, the impact of Wales-based agents in this respect is only statistically 
significant in 2010, when they were more likely to perceive fraud. Overall, as predicted, the 
country in which elections are taking place does matter in respect of evaluations of electoral 
integrity, and as with Clark’s analysis (2015, 2017), these evaluations are generally higher in 
Scotland than in the rest of Great Britain (H4).  The level of urban characteristics also has 
clear effects in all models (H5). Agents in more urban seats are less likely to be satisfied with 
electoral administration and more likely to perceive fraud. This pattern is exactly as predicted, 
with a lower level of assessment of positive electoral integrity being associated with a higher 
perception of negative electoral integrity.  H4 and H5 are therefore confirmed. 
 
Finally, we examine the impact of the electoral profile of a seat and find some support for both 
H6 and H7. While marginality has no statistically significant impact on agents’ satisfaction with 
electoral administration, it does have a clear impact on perceptions of fraud in the pooled 
analysis of 2015 and 2017. In those election years, agents were more likely to perceive fraud 
in more marginal seats (H7), reflecting the findings of Alvarez & Boehmke in the US (2008) 
and Eisenstadt in Mexico (cited in Lehoucq, 2003: 250). The outcome of elections, however, 
has a clear and consistent effect in all models. Agents of candidates who won their electoral 
contest are more likely to be satisfied with electoral administration and less likely to perceive 
fraud, again reflecting the expected pattern of results - those who had higher evaluations of 
positive electoral integrity had lower perceptions of negative electoral integrity (H6). H6 is 
therefore confirmed and there is also partial support for H7. 
 
Table 3. Predictors of Satisfaction with Electoral Administration (2010, 2015 & 2017) and Perceptions 
of Electoral Fraud (2010) (2015, 2017) (Ordinal Regression) 
 Satisfaction with Electoral 
Administration 
Perceptions of Fraud  
2010 
Perceptions of Fraud  
2015 & 2017 
 b SE Sig b SE Sig b SE Sig 
Experience 0.062 0.074 n.s. -0.231 0.127 n.s. 0.051 0.129 n.s. 
Conservative 0.335 0.105 ** 0.478 0.172 ** 0.954 0.180 ** 
Labour 0.228 0.088 ** -0.414 0.156 ** -0.079 0.160 n.s. 
Wales 0.809 0.170 ** 0.668 0.249 ** -0.067 0.285 n.s. 
Scotland 0.624 0.130 ** -0.779 0.242 ** -0.627 0.252 ** 
Urbanness -0.084 0.036 * 0.525 0.062 ** 0.484 0.058 ** 
Majority t-1 0.001 0.003 n.s 0.002 0.005 n.s. -0.021 0.005 ** 
Seat Winner 0.828 0.094 ** -0.440 0.149 ** -0.642 0.161 ** 
2015 -0.558 0.087 ** N/A   N/A   
2017 -0.365 0.092 ** N/A   0.293 0.130 * 
Nagalkerke R2   0.096   0.138   0.123 
n   2698   982   1200 
Note: ** p<0.01  * p<0.05  n.s. Not Significant 
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Table 4. Predictors of Perceptions of Electoral Fraud (2010) (2015, 2017) (Logistic Regression)  
 
 2010 2015 & 2017 
 b SE Sig Exp (B) b SE Sig Exp (B) 
Experience -0.278 0.135 * 0.758 0.026 0.133 n.s. 1.027 
Conservative 0.456 0.190 * 1.577 0.701 0.191 ** 2.016 
Labour -0.449 0.163 ** 0.639 -0.139 0.163 n.s. 0.870 
Wales 0.635 0.274 * 1.887 0.070 0.286 n.s. 1.072 
Scotland -0.757 0.246 ** 0.469 -0.592 0.256 * 0.553 
Urbanness 0.441 0.077 ** 1.554 0.490 0.065 ** 1.632 
Majority t-1 -0.001 0.006 n.s. 0.999 -0.017 0.005 ** 0.983 
Seat Winner -0.428 0.160 ** 0.652 -0.494 0.168 ** 0.610 
2017 N/A    0.222 0.134 n.s. 1.249 
Constant 0.282 0.161 n.s. 1.326 -0.425 0.174 * 0.654 
Nagalkerke R2    0.115    0.113 
n    982    1200 




Evaluations of electoral integrity can be both negative and positive. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
most attention has tended to be paid to negative perceptions, through as Norris (2018) 
correctly argues, a better overview is gained by analysing both negative and positive 
evaluations as well as a range of other indicators. Coupled with this typical focus on negative 
perceptions, it is arguable that citizens tend to have an inflated view of the degree of electoral 
malpractice and fraud. Thus, despite the UK being one of the better performing democracies 
in Norris et al’s (2018) ranking, nearly 40% of citizens suspect fraud at general elections 
(Ipsos-MORI, 2015; Electoral Commission, 2017) . Compared with the findings featured in this 
study derived from a more informed group of electoral users (electoral agents) this would 
suggest that as with other studies in the UK and USA, citizen evaluations of electoral 
malpractice may be exaggerated (Electoral Commission, 2014; Norris et al, 2017). 
 
But was is also clear is that evaluations of both negative and positive electoral integrity are 
not uniform amongst electoral users. What is apparent in both measures is that the impact of 
electoral victory or defeat informs judgements. Electoral regulators, should perhaps consider 
the electoral status of the accuser (negative electoral integrity) or admirer (positive electoral 
integrity) when assessing views on the performance of electoral administration. But equally, 
geography matters. Not only is electoral integrity in Scotland generally higher than in the rest 
of Great Britain, but dissatisfaction with electoral administration and perceptions of electoral 
fraud are at their highest in urban environments – characterised by higher population density, 
higher levels of ethnic diversity and a larger rented housing sector. Regulators, then, should 
perhaps target their efforts on improving electoral administration and minimizing perceptions 
of fraud in these urban areas. The Electoral Commission (2014: 3) recommended such a 
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strategy in 2014 and this analysis reinforces the wisdom of that approach. Indeed, given the 
importance of the winner/loser effects, what is remarkable is that these effects endure to such 
a degree. 
 
Overall, this article analyses a hitherto unresearched group of electoral users in respect of 
evaluations relating to electoral integrity – election agents. And as with other comprehensive 
assessments, analyses both negative and positive evaluations. The findings are important 
because they reveal three key things that significantly enhance the study of electoral integrity.  
First, it allows for an important comparison with electoral consumers. The finding suggests 
that the perceptions of informed participants (electoral users) do not reflect the levels of 
negative perceptions found amongst electoral consumers (electors). Citizen perceptions 
matter, of course. But as with other areas of public policy, care should be taken when using 
citizen perceptions to inform policy-making – especially when those perceptions are seemingly 
inaccurate (see also vanHeerde-Hudson & Fisher, 2013). Concerns about electoral integrity 
are clearly justified, but examinations of citizen perceptions alone are likely to paint an 
exaggerated picture.  
 
Second, the unique data set allows for detailed analysis at the micro (district or constituency) 
level, rather than just painting an aggregated one at the macro (national) level. This analysis 
reveals that electoral integrity in Britain is subject to significant variation and that it is more of 
a localized issue than one that is more widespread. Finally, it reveals that as with electoral 
consumers, winner/loser effects are also highly significant amongst electoral users – despite 
their greater knowledge of electoral processes. But, even once we take the important 
winner/loser effects into account, we still observe very significant geographical effects, and in 
a less predictable way, the impact of partisan cues. In terms of electoral integrity, then, the 
winner does not take it all. Partisan cues and especially geography also matter a great deal. 
Overall, questions of electoral integrity are neither uniform, nor divorced from political 
considerations, geographical variation or electoral outcomes. Both policy-makers and scholars 
should take account of such variation and focus attention accordingly. 
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Population Density .928 
Proportion Non-White .852 





Population Density .937 
Proportion Non-White .870 





Population Density .764 
Proportion Non-White .894 







 2010 2015 2017 
Conservative 287 244 180 
Labour 388 336 333 
Liberal Democrat 353 332 334 
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